Course Objective & Scope
As developers and business users rapidly connect third-party Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and prebuilt tool packages to IDEs, desktop assistants and enterprise agents, a major new supply chain attack surface has emerged. Hidden instructions inside an MCP tool description can exfiltrate data from another server, or a silently mutated tool definition (rug pull) can hijack agent behaviour.
This course examines MCP protocol internals, tool poisoning, tool shadowing, credential leakage and multi-agent (A2A) supply chain risks through hands-on labs, guiding participants to design an approved enterprise MCP registry, gateway and security standard.
Who Should Attend?
- AI and platform engineers building MCP servers and clients
- Security teams governing AI-assisted IDEs (Cursor, Claude Code, Copilot) and enterprise agents
- Application security (AppSec) and software supply chain security specialists
- Prerequisite: familiarity with JSON-RPC / API integrations and LLM tool calling
Key Takeaways
- Analyse trust boundaries across host, client and server components in the MCP architecture
- Demonstrate tool description poisoning, cross-server tool shadowing and rug pull attacks in the lab
- Verify MCP servers using code review, static/dynamic scanning and schema pinning/signing
- Enforce authentication, permission filtering and payload inspection on an enterprise MCP gateway
- Establish an approved MCP server catalogue and onboarding policy for IDEs and enterprise agents
Curriculum
The Supply Chain Surface of MCP and the Agentic Ecosystem
- MCP architecture (Host, Client, Server; Tools, Resources, Prompts, Sampling) and stdio vs HTTP/SSE transports
- Risks of open-source MCP packages, ephemeral npx/uvx execution and unverified plugins
Tool Poisoning, Shadowing and Rug Pull Attacks
- Hidden instructions embedded inside tool descriptions and parameter schemas
- Cross-server tool shadowing of trusted connectors (e.g. email, GitHub) and post-approval rug pulls
Exploitation and Detection Lab
- Exfiltrating SSH keys or corporate data via a trojanised MCP server in a sandbox
- Scanning MCP schemas, tool descriptions and runtime traffic with security inspection tools
Secure MCP Server Development and Deployment
- Pinned versions, cryptographic schema hash pinning and containerised isolation
- OAuth 2.1 authorization for MCP, least privilege and restricting client-side sampling
Enterprise MCP Gateway and Governance
- Central MCP proxy/gateway enforcing tool allowlists, description sanitisation and rate limits
- Operating an approved internal MCP registry for developer workstations and production agents
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